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Introduction
Perhaps more so than any of its peers worldwide, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) depends increasingly on cyberspace to execute critical 
missions that are vital to maintaining American military superiority in the 
traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space. As a result, the U.S. is 
arguably more at risk to an asymmetric attack vector launched by an 
adversary that cannot, or chooses not to, confront the U.S. in a conven-
tional conflict. In the end, the military advantages that net-centricity pro-
vides the U.S. military concomitantly offer an adversary affordable attack 
vectors through cyberspace against critical missions and advanced 
weapon systems.
Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms,1 defines cyberspace as "a global domain within the information 
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environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers," 
and cyberspace operations as "the employment of cyber capabilities 
where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or 
through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network opera-
tions and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid."
When the U.S. Air Force and the DoD formally identified cyberspace as a 
legitimate war-fighting domain on par with land, sea, air, and space, the 
attention focused initially on computer networks and the information that 
traverses them, and the desire to deliver—and the imperative to defend 
against—military effects in cyberspace. Recent studies by the Defense Sci-
ence Board, as well as congressional and White House reports,2, 3 con-
curred on the urgent national need to shift the cybersecurity posture from 
defending computer networks to assuring critical missions.
Mission Assurance
DoD Directive 3020.40 defines Mission Assurance (MA) as "a process to 
ensure that assigned tasks or duties can be performed in accordance with 
the intended purpose or plan.4 It is a summation of the activities and 
measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting 
infrastructures are available to the DoD to carry out the National Military 
Strategy." In accordance with this directive, a principal responsibility of a 
commander is to assure mission execution in a timely manner. The reli-
ance of a Mission Essential Function (MEF) on cyberspace makes cyber-
space a center of gravity an adversary may exploit and, in doing so, 
enable that adversary to directly engage the MEF without the employ-
ment of conventional forces or weapons.
For the operational purposes of mission assurance, cyberspace operations 
occur when a signal affects an intelligent system. In this definition,
•   Intelligent system refers to a stored-program computer—any central 
processing unit (CPU) that executes a sequence of instructions
•   Signal refers to an information-modulated waveform
Thus, a cyber operation occurs every time an external signal modifies the 
flow of control or information in an intelligent system.
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This article proposes adopting the operational definition of a cyber pro-
cess as a program executing in an intelligent system. This definition pro-
vides a foundation for mission assurance in a contested environment. 
Using intelligent systems as building blocks, we can decompose a mission 
into logically interconnected components of intelligent systems.
We characterize missions by the security attributes of the execution envi-
ronments of their cyber processes and their communication processes. 
Mission criticality and prioritization dictate the level of granularity of the 
decomposition of a mission into cyber processes. This decomposition per-
mits measuring the assurance of a mission as a function of its constituent 
components.
Mission assurance can focus on each cyber process and its interactions 
with internal and external processes as having potential vulnerabilities to 
external signals. Thus, the elemental activity of information communica-
tion among processes provides a focal analysis point for both specification 
and implementation vulnerabilities.
Decomposing a mission into its atomic cyber processes provides the 
means for specifying operational mitigation measures through the impo-
sition of security attributes on these processes and their inter-process 
interactions. An atomic cyber process refers to the lowest architectural 
level at which a system generates, processes, stores, or transmits data. 
Security attributes include the fundamental information assurance (IA) 
tenets of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and attri-
bution, as well as state-of-the-practice provision of these tenets through 
cryptography, diversity, agility, and trust.
Principles of War in the Cyber Domain
This section introduces warfare in the cyber domain, identifies the weak-
nesses of the traditional approach to building reliable systems, and leads 
to an alternative approach that seeks to build secure systems.
Engineering focuses traditionally on designing, developing, building, test-
ing, and deploying complex systems that operate reliably in a permissive 
environment, but fail catastrophically in a contested environment. Mis-
taking reliability for security characterizes a generation of military, indus-
trial, and financial systems that make little to no provision for functional 
vulnerability to cross-domain cyber threats.
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Rule 1 – Reliability does not equal security.
In this context, cybersecurity focuses disproportionately on threats—
hackers, criminals, terrorists, and states—instead of system vulnerabili-
ties. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines 
risk to information systems as "a function of the likelihood of a given 
threat-source exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the 
resulting impact of that adverse event" and a threat as "the potential for a 
particular threat-source to successfully exercise a particular vulnerabil-
ity."5 Threat and vulnerability are dependent variables in the NIST defini-
tion; thus a threat requires the existence of a vulnerability to exploit.
Rule 2 – There is no threat without vulnerability.
Cryptography enables the Information Assurance attributes of confidenti-
ality, integrity, availability, authentication, and attribution as they apply 
to information at rest or in motion. For the purpose of MA, we further 
break down the states of information.
Rule 3 – An information system acts on information at one or more 
stages of the information lifecycle:
1. Information generation
2. Information processing
3. Information storage
4. Information communication
5. Information consumption
6. Information destruction
To permit functional representation of relationships among processes 
within a mission, we define a hierarchy whereby a mission consists of 
functions, a function consists of systems, a system consists of subsystems, 
a subsystem consists of components, and a component consists of indivis-
ible atomic nodes. The number of layers in a decomposition—set arbi-
trarily at six—and the granularity of abstraction depend on the mission at 
hand. However, the two ends of the spectrum present bookends to the 
decomposition.
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Rule 4 – A critical function—and for that matter a system or a sub-
system—consists of a set of cooperating processes executing on atomic 
cyber nodes that generate, process, store, communicate, consume, or 
destroy information.
Corollary – Every atomic cyber process belongs to a function.
Mission dependence on cyberspace consists of the dependence on atomic 
cyber nodes within the mission, the internal interactions among these 
nodes, and their external interactions with the outside world. The hierar-
chical mission decomposition outlined above exhibits certain fractal 
properties. Provable properties between a system and its subsystems are 
also provable between a mission and its functions, a function and its sys-
tems, a subsystem and its components, and a component and its nodes.
Rule 5 – If a system generates information, then at least one of its sub-
systems generates information.
Corollary – If no subsystem generates information, then the parent sys-
tem does not generate information.
Rule 5 and its corollary apply equally to information processing, storage, 
consumption, and destruction. For the purpose of this decomposition, an 
Input / Output (IO) communication node is bidirectional if it is capable of 
both information transmission and reception.
Rule 6 – If a system transmits or receives information, then at least one 
of its subsystems transmits or receives information.
Corollary – The fact that a subsystem transmits or receives information 
is not sufficient to conclude that the parent system transmits or receives 
information.
Rule 7 – Information exchange between systems occurs through paired 
transmit-receive IO nodes.
Rule 8 – An external threat exercises an internal vulnerability only 
through an IO node.
Rules 6–8 permit focusing vulnerability mitigation on external transmit 
nodes. Thus, a system without an external IO node does not present a vul-
nerability to external threats.
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Rule 9 – An internal threat at a higher layer becomes an external threat 
at a lower layer.
This rule offers a new way to address the insider threat to a system, reduc-
ing it to an external threat against an IO node in a vulnerable subsystem.
Rule 10 – A vulnerability in a subsystem becomes a vulnerability in a 
parent system if and only if the IO node in the subsystem is an external 
IO node in the parent system.
This rule allows limiting the impact of a weak link on a system by isolating 
the vulnerabilities of the weak link from potential threats in the outside 
world. The vulnerability extends to multiple missions that share a com-
mon function, system, subsystem, component, or node; and multiple 
functions and systems may share a component or node.
Rule 11 – A vulnerable system supporting two functions renders both 
functions vulnerable if and only if the vulnerable system contains an IO 
node that connects one of the functions to an external system.
The success of a cyberattack that follows the kill chain of a traditional 
kinetic operation—consisting of the distinct steps of Find, Fix, Track, Tar-
get, Engage, Assess (F2T2EA)—requires information resources at the tar-
get system, including process, store, and IO nodes, for each step of the kill 
chain. This provides an effective defensive strategy against this class of 
cyberattacks.
Rule 12 – Breaking the threat kill-chain at any phase of F2T2EA denies 
threat success.
Corollary – Assuring the kill chain of a friendly cyberattack requires 
assuring the information lifecycle at all phases of the F2T2EA.
Mission Assurance End Game
The ultimate goal of mission assurance is to develop an engineering cul-
ture that mathematically represents the specifications of a critical MEF 
and verifies its implementation. Representing a MEF as a fractal system 
of cyber systems with the help of queuing theory provides a tool for rea-
soning on security properties and proving certain relationships among 
vulnerabilities and threats.
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Traditional formal verification suffers from state-space explosion as soon 
as the size of the system under consideration exceeds trivial classroom 
examples. Conversely, a fractal approach to MA avoids state-space explo-
sion by sidestepping discrete simulations in favor of analytical estimation. 
IBM's Research Queuing RESQ package achieved similar efficiency by 
representing communications networks as queuing systems rather than 
discrete systems.6
While availability and mean time between failures (MTBF) provide useful 
metrics to estimate the reliability of complex systems of physical compo-
nents, mission assurance requires different metrics. The intertwined 
properties of vulnerability and threat offer an unbounded continuum 
across which to measure mission assurance in terms of cost, transforming 
MA metrics into the economics of security.
Rule 13 – MA relates (1) the cost of securing a MEF and (2) the conse-
quence of security failure to (3) the cost to a threat intent on exploiting 
the MEF and (4) the benefit to a successful threat.
The cost of security as a metric applies equally to future systems and 
existing systems. For the latter, MA relates the cost of vulnerability miti-
gation to the cost of threat success and the consequences in the cost of a 
failed mission.
The secure engineering practices proposed above hold promise for future 
system design, yet offer little relief to legacy systems. The next section of 
this paper presents stopgap measures to assure existing systems in a con-
tested cyber environment.
Methodology
Mission assurance in a contested cyber domain requires a four-step pro-
cess: (1) prioritization, (2) mapping, (3) vulnerability assessment, and (4) 
mitigation:
1. Prioritization: Develop a list of MEFs, and prioritize them with respect 
to the overall mission of a command. For those MEFs deemed critical, 
systematic cyber mitigation must follow the steps below. This prioriti-
zation step belongs to the mission commander and relies primarily on 
the domain experts who own the mission.
2. Mission mapping: Decompose each critical MEF into a number of lay-
ers that represent sub-functions, relationships, responsibilities, and 
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systems, culminating in a logical representation of the atomic cyber 
processes that enable the MEF. Mission mapping requires collabora-
tion between mission owners and cyber advisors. The fidelity of the 
mapping depends primarily on the criticality of the MEF in question.
3. Vulnerability assessment: Through a tabletop war game by a combined 
blue team of cyber experts and mission domain experts, conduct a sys-
tematic assessment of MEF susceptibility to process failures, and the 
vulnerability of both atomic cyber processes and inter-process commu-
nication to accidents and attacks. The success of this step requires a 
current understanding of the cyber threats capable of exploiting identi-
fied vulnerabilities.
4. Mitigation: Develop operational measures to mitigate the vulnerabili-
ties identified in Step 3. Specify these measures as security attributes 
applicable to the atomic cyber processes and the inter-process commu-
nications among them.
5. Red teaming (optional): An optional fifth step in this process brings in 
an external red team of cyber aggressors to test the effectiveness of the 
mitigation measures.
The evolution of the cyber threat landscape dictates conducting this MA 
process at all stages of weapon-system development. In the notional time-
line of the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Life 
Cycle Management System,7 conduct MA analysis at the Material Solution 
Analysis Phase (Milestone A), Technology Development Phase (Milestone 
B), Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase (Milestone C), 
Production and Deployment Phase (Initial Operating Condition), and 
Operations and Support Phase (Full Operating Condition.)
Prioritization
The prioritization step belongs to the mission commander and deals with 
identifying and prioritizing the critical functions, scoping the mission 
mapping activity, and establishing boundaries. MEF prioritization is fun-
damentally a non-cyber process and includes:
•   Defining explicitly the scope of the study by enumerating the MEFs of 
interest
•   Specifying the interfaces of the MEFs to their surroundings and the 
external world
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•   Prioritizing the MEFs as an initial assessment of acceptable risk
•   Understanding the priorities of the mission commander permits the 
cyber engineer to estimate the granularity of the cyber mapping as a 
function of MEF criticality
Mission Mapping
Mapping mission dependence in cyberspace requires identifying the 
atomic cyber processes that make up the mission. Mission mapping 
includes the following steps:
•   Decompose the mission into its constituent components.
•   Identify all the stored-program processors in an MEF in the atomic 
cyber processes
•   Identify the make and model of each processor, the fabrication technol-
ogy, clock speed, storage architecture, amount of cache and primary 
storage, and input/output devices.
•   Define the function of each processor—sensing, computing, storing, or 
transmitting data.
•   Identify all data storage components within an MEF.
•   Identify all data communication among cyber processes, and between 
the MEF and the outside world.
•   List all the architectural layers that each processor implements.
•   List all the programs that the processor executes at each layer.
•   Characterize non-volatile storage in terms of pedigree, technology, and 
capacity.
•   Document the data format, speed, and protocol for each data commu-
nication process.
Vulnerability Assessment
Mapping mission dependence on cyberspace generates a detailed diagram 
of the functionality of each atomic cyber process and the interaction 
among connected processes. This diagram facilitates and enables edu-
cated and informed cyber experts to conduct a meaningful and realistic 
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tabletop blue team vulnerability assessment for each process based on 
known threats. The ultimate goal is to provide a quantitative risk assess-
ment of each process and to use these assessments to compute an overall 
mission assurance. Vulnerability assessment includes the following steps:
•   For each sensor, assess its potential malicious use as an entry vector 
into the system.
•   For each processing unit, estimate the risk based on the software it exe-
cutes and the documented vulnerabilities and threats.
•   For each storage unit, estimate the vulnerabilities and threats.
•   For each data communication channel, estimate the threats to protocol 
and implementation vulnerabilities.
•   For each vulnerability, define its temporal and spatial properties and 
estimate their effects.
•   Where feasible, combine into a larger cyber process those adjacent 
atomic cyber processes that share storage or communication resources.
•   Compute an overall mission assurance metric as a measure of MEF 
susceptibility to cyber threats and as an input to inform a mission com-
mander about risk management.
Threat Mitigation
Mitigation strategies focus on those atomic cyber processes, sensors, stor-
age units, and inter-process communications that present the largest vul-
nerability surface for unintended cyber incidents and malicious cyber 
attacks. Mitigation strategies include measures to reduce the exposure to, 
and impact of, a cyber compromise, such as:
•   Defensive posture realignment from intrusion detection to threat 
denial
•   Physical and logical system isolation
•   Virtualization and MEF recomposition
•   Static threat avoidance by moving vulnerabilities out of band through 
system redesign
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•   Domain modification through protocol flattening, just-in-time imple-
mentation, and hardware-software tradeoffs
•   Polymorphism through protocol and implementation modification
•   Agility for real-time dynamic threat avoidance
•   Hardening of the information assurance attribute of confidentiality 
through encryption
•   Application of authentication measures
•   Redundancy and artificial diversity to protect against monoculture vul-
nerability
•   Compilation into hardware-critical software segments to protect 
against modification
•   Selective insertion of Government Off The Shelf (GOTS) technology 
into Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) systems to harden against com-
mon threats
Red Teaming (Optional)
The utility of red teaming is limited by the ability of the red team to accu-
rately replicate the adversarial threat to a given mission. Aggressors have 
traditionally employed a three-step strategy that has been consistently 
effective over time, but has yet to be proven in the cyber domain. This 
strategy involves the following:
•   Understand the threat
•   Replicate the threat
•   Exercise the threat
While this strategy works well against poorly-protected computer 
networks, it falls short in assessing the vulnerability of a critical MEF to 
cyberattack for two key reasons. First, aggressors have little 
documentation of threats against DoD MEFs that they can understand, let 
alone replicate and exercise. Second, aggressors typically lack domain 
expertise in specific MEFs, making their network attacks inconsequential 
to MEF execution.
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This optional step of red teaming serves to satisfy the misplaced belief in 
the usefulness of red team assessment of mission assurance. While red 
teaming has no drawbacks, its contribution remains inherently limited. 
The failure to compromise a system may be evidence of red team inexpe-
rience, not system resilience. We must not confuse the absence of evi-
dence of vulnerability as evidence of the absence of vulnerability.
Multidimensional Dependencies
We have so far outlined in this article a methodology to map the depen-
dence of MEFs on the underlying cyber infrastructure. Static mapping 
assumes that MEF dependence on cyber remains constant in time and 
location. This section examines MEF temporal and spatial dependencies.
Short-term temporal changes in mission assurance can occur in the nor-
mal course of mission execution. These changes occur when mission exe-
cution transitions among processes with different vulnerabilities. Long-
term trends affecting mission assurance result from technology obsoles-
cence, vulnerability discovery, and threat evolution. Long-term trends 
necessitate the reassessment of mission assurance on a periodic basis, 
especially over the lifecycle development of a weapon system.
Spatial dependencies occur when a system encounters different threats 
based on their geographic location. Kinetic threats unfold in a substan-
tially different extent on a battlefield than in a home-base environment. 
Similarly, certain systems may encounter location-specific cyber threats 
that dictate a recomputation of mission assurance on a regional basis.
The granularity of the mission mapping may affect the fidelity of the mis-
sion assurance estimate. Too coarse a system-level decomposition may 
overlook device-level vulnerabilities. Too fine a device-level decomposi-
tion may miss system-level dependencies.
Conclusion
This article explored the critical vulnerability facing the Department of 
Defense, namely the dependence of critical MEFs on a contested cyber-
space. Additionally, the article described the cyber environment, identi-
fied a method to catalog cyber vulnerabilities that may provide attack 
vectors against MEFs, and outlined a methodology to assure these MEFs 
in a contested cyber environment. The prescription for DoD MEF assur-
ance laid out a series of steps, starting with prioritizing missions, map-
ping their dependence on the cyber domain, identifying vulnerabilities, 
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and mitigating these vulnerabilities. Finally, it offered a set of rules to 
guide the design of future systems, as well as a stopgap approach for 
assuring legacy systems.
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